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SECURITIES
INTRODUCTION
During the survey period' the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was
both on the cutting edge and playing catch-up in the area of securities
law. This approach resulted in the court expanding section 10(b) liability
in one instance and restricting it in another. In Sonnenfeld v. City and
County of Denver,2 the Tenth Circuit considered, as a matter of first im-
pression, whether municipalities were subject to section 10(b) liability
for the sale of municipal securities.3 Concentrating on a 1975 amendment
to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934," the court determined that Con-
gress intended federal securities regulations to apply to municipalities
By contrast, in Grossman v. Novell, Inc.,' the Tenth Circuit effec-
tively provided potential section 10(b) violators with a possible defense
when it adopted the "bespeaks caution" doctrine as a valid defense to
securities fraud. The court determined that the "bespeaks caution" doc-
trine' was the proper vehicle for determining that certain statements con-
nected with the sale of securities were immaterial because they were
accompanied by sufficient cautionary language.9
This survey examines the different approaches utilized and results
reached by the Tenth Circuit in securities regulation. Part I provides a
basic background on section 10(b) actions. Part II discusses municipal
liability and addresses the Tenth Circuit's first impression holding in
Sonnenfeld, and the effect which that holding will have on securities
regulation. Part III considers the Tenth Circuit's adoption of the "be-
speaks caution" doctrine.
I. BACKGROUND OF SECURITIES FRAUD UNDER SECTION 10(b)
A. Federal Securities Legislation
In the early 1930s, with the country and the world reeling from the
effects of the Great Depression, Congress enacted two monumental
pieces of securities legislation. First, Congress passed the Securities Act
i. The survey covers cases decided between September 1, 1996 and August 31, 1997.
2. 100 F.3d 744 (10th Cir. 1996).
3. Sonnenfeld, 100 F.3d at 748-49.
4. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified in scattered
subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 78).
5. Sonnenfeld, 100 F.3d at 747.
6. 120F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1997).
7. Grossman, 120 F.3d at 1122.
8. See infra Part III.A for a discussion of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine.
9. Grossman, 120 F.3d at 1122.
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of 1933 (1933 Act),' which required full disclosure of material informa-
tion for first-time public offerings." Second, Congress passed the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act),' 2 which was designed to
regulate the exchange of securities in the post-distribution stage or sec-
ondary markets.' 3 The Exchange Act included five principle functions:
(1) overseeing and regulating the securities market, (2) requiring a meas-
ure of disclosure for would-be investors, (3) controlling credit extended
to the marketplace, (4) creating the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC), and (5) preventing fraud in the trade of securities and manipula-
tion of such markets. 4 The Exchange Act established multiple antifraud
provisions aimed at preventing deceptive trading of securities in both
primary and secondary markets." Of the antifraud provisions, the most
frequently used and broadest in scope is section 78j(b),'6 more com-
monly known as section 10(b)."
Unlike the other antifraud provisions the Exchange Act,'" section
10(b) has very few limitations.'9 Section 10(b) is not limited to broker-
dealers, but extends to "any person.'' It applies to both securities pur-
chases and sales2' and prohibits fraudulent conduct regardless of whether
the security is listed on an exchange or sold over-the-counter.' Finally,
the statutory language "public interest or the protection of investors"
10. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§
77a-77aa (West 1997)).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1994).
12. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-78mm (West 1997)).
13. See Scott M. Murray, Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver: The
Supreme Court Chops a Bough from the Judicial Oak: There Is No Implied Remedy to Sue for Aid-
ing and Abetting Under Section 10(b) and SEC Rule lOb-5, 30 NEW ENG. L. REV. 475, 481 (1996).
14. See I LouIs Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 228-29 (3d ed. 1989).
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(4) (1994) (prohibiting a dealer or broker from making a false or
misleading statement for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of a security listed on a na-
tional securities exchange); id. § 78o(c)(i) (prohibiting brokers, dealers and municipal securities
dealers from using mails or interstate commerce to induce the purchase or sale of any security not
listed on a national exchange in a manipulative, deceptive, or fraudulent manner).
16. This section is located in 15 U.S.C.
17. See NORMAN S. POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION § 3.1.2.4, at 226
(1995).
18. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(a)(4), 78o(c)(1).
19. The relevant text of section I0(b) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or in-
strumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any securities
exchange ... [tlo use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale for any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any ma-
nipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors.
Id. § 78j(b).
20. See POSER, supra note 17, at 227; see also infra Part I1.A for a discussion of the definition
of "person" under section 10(b).




gives the SEC almost unlimited rule-making power.' This delegated
rule-making power is crucial considering that the text of section 10(b)
articulates no specific prohibitions.'4 Instead, section 10(b) can be viewed
as an "enabling provision" which grants the SEC the power to promul-
gate rules.'
Pursuant to the authority granted by section 10(b), the SEC enacted
Rule 1Ob-5 in 1948.26 Rule lOb-5 makes it "unlawful for any person... to
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud."'2 Thus Congress, by
enacting section 10(b), and the SEC, by promulgating Rule lOb-5, cre-
ated a powerful antifraud device.
B. Implied Private Cause ofAction
Missing from both section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 is any mention of a
private cause of action. The omission was remedied in 1946, when a
Pennsylvania federal district court in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.'
held there was an implied private cause of action under section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5.' The court relied on the general tort principles espoused in
the first Restatement of Torts?0 Twenty-five years later, in Superinten-
dent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty, Co.,3' the U.S. Supreme
Court recognized the implied private right of action under section 10(b)."
23. See id.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
25. Murray, supra note 13, at 483.
26. 13 Fed. Reg. 8183 (1948) (codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997)). The rule
was so named because it was the fifth rule promulgated under section 10(b). See T. James Lee, Jr.,
Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank: Plain Language and the Implied Private Right of Action
Under Section 10(b) and )Ob-5, 1995 BYU L. REV. 269, 271 n.17 (1995).
27. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. The rule provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person ...
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact nec-
essary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in an act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any secu-
rity.
Id.
28. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
29. Kardon, 69 F. Supp. at 514 ("In other words, in view of the general purpose of the act, the
mere omission of an express provision for civil liability is not sufficient to negative what the general
law implies.").
30. Section 286 states that:
The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or by failing to do a
required act, makes the actor liable for an invasion of an interest of another if:
(a) the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an interest of the other
as an individual; and
(b) the interest invaded is one which the enactment is intended to protect ....
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1934).
31. 404U.S.6(1971).
32. Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 13 n.9.
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More recently, in Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston,33 the Court stated
that the existence of an implied private cause of action under section
10(b) was "beyond peradventure. '34 Thus, by the beginning of the sur-
vey period, while municipality liability for violation of section 10(b)
and the status of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine may have been in
question in the Tenth Circuit, the existence of an implied private
cause of action for violations of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 was an
irrefutable fact.
II. MUNICIPALITIES AND SECURITIES REGULATION
A. Background
1. Pre-1975 Amendment
Section 10(b) makes it unlawful for "any person" to a use a ma-
nipulative or deceptive device in the purchase or sale of a security." Prior
to 1975, the definition of "person," which is supplied by section 3(a)(9)
of the Exchange Act,36 did not include government entities." Recognizing
this, courts had refused to impose section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 liability
on municipalities for fraudulent conduct in connection with the purchase
or sale of securities when the suspected conduct occurred before the
1975 amendment.
In Brown v. City of Covington,"' the Sixth Circuit considered
whether the City of Covington was a "person" under the Exchange Act's
pre-1975 definition, and therefore subject to section 10(b) and Rule lOb-
5.9 Appellants alleged that the city, in the issuance of bonds, failed to
disclose numerous material facts in violation of section 10(b). ' The facts
surrounding the omissions, the appellants alleged, were known to the
city, and were the direct cause of the appellants' loss."' The trial court
33. 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
34. Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 380.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
36. Id. § 78c(a)(9). Though codified as section c(a)(9) of the Exchange Act, this section was
originally published in the public laws as section 3(a)(9). Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404,
§ 3(a)(9), 48 Stat. 881,883 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(9) (1994)). Despite
this change, the section is still commonly referred to in the securities trade, and will be referred to in
the text of this paper, as section 3(a)(9).
37. Prior to the amendment the statute read, "The term 'person' means an individual, a corpo-
ration, a partnership, an association, a joint-stock company, a business trust, or an unincorporated
organization." Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(9).
38. 805 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1986).
39. Brown, 805 F.2d at 1268.
40. Id. at 1267-68. The information which the appellants claimed the city failed to disclose
included: profits which would run to promoters through construction costs, the existence of two
unfavorable feasibility reports, the close relationship between the promoters and the underwriters,
and the profitability of the health care center which the bonds were issued to construct. Id. at 1267.
41. Id. at 1268.
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awarded summary judgment to the defendant, holding that the city was
not a person under the Exchange Act's pre-1975 definition."' The Sixth
Circuit affirmed. 3
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the city was not subject to section
10(b) liability for three reasons." First, the 1933 Act's definition of "per-
son" specifically included "government or political subdivision[s]."
Prior to 1975, the Exchange Act's definition of person blatantly omitted
reference to the government even though the Exchange Act was passed
only a year after the 1933 Act.' Second, the 1975 amendment to the Ex-
change Act's definition of "person," which added government entities to
the list of parties subject to section 10(b) liability, provided persuasive
proof that prior to 1975, Congress did not intend to include government
agencies in its definition of "person. ''" Finally, every other court that
considered this issue came to the same conclusion, thus supporting the
Sixth Circuit's position. '
2. Post-1975 Amendment
As previously stated, in 1975 Congress amended the definition of
"person" under the Securities Exchange Act of 193 4 ,' adding govern-
ments and their agencies to the list. Thus, today the Exchange Act's defi-
nition of "person" includes "government, or political subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality of a government."' This change to the defini-
tion appears to subject government entities to the antifraud provisions of
the Exchange Act. Until 1996, however, only two federal district courts
considered whether the amendment exposed municipalities to section
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1269.
45. See id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2)).
46. See id. at 1269-70 (citing In re New York Mun. Sec. Litig., 507 F. Supp. 169, 181-82
(S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
47. The amended Exchange Act definition of "person" read: "The term 'person' means a
natural person, company, government, or political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of a gov-
emnment." Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 3(2), 89 Stat. 97 (1975) (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (1994)); see Brown, 805 F.2d at 1270.
48. Brown, 805 F.2d at 1270.
49. Id. (citing New York City Mun., 507 F. Supp. at 181-82; Woods v. Homes & Structures
489 F. Supp. 1270 (D. Kan. 1980); In re Equity Funding Corp. of America Sec. Litig., 416 F. Supp.
161 (C.D. Cal. 1976); and Greenspan v. Crosbie, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) $ 95,780 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 1976)). The Southern District of New York is considered a
preeminent authority in the securities field. Therefore, the New York City Municipal case provided
persuasive precedent for the Brown decision.
50. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified in scattered
subsections of IS U.S.C. § 78).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (1994).
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10(b) liability. 2 In both cases the courts rejected defendants' argument
that a municipality was not subject to section 10(b) liability.3
The district court in Washington Public Power was the first to im-
pose section 10(b) liability on a municipality. Bonds in the amount of
$2.25 billion were issued to finance the construction of two nuclear
power plants.5 Purchasers of the bonds brought a securities fraud action
against numerous defendants after the project developed serious prob-
lems leading to the termination, and eventual default, by the Supply
System on its bond obligation.56 The municipal defendants 7 argued that
the implied private right of action under section 10(b) did not apply to
municipalities. 8 When considering the defendants' argument, the court in
Washington Public Power established the analysis that would be applied,
expanded, and followed in later cases.
Initially, the court dealt with the municipal defendants' argument
that the 1975 amendment to the definition of "person" did not create a
private right of action against municipalities. 9 The defendants based this
argument on their interpretation of the legislative history surrounding the
1975 amendment.' In the end, however, the court determined that the
plain language of section 3(a)(9) was the "best guide to congressional
intent."' Compelled by the clear language of the statute, the court held
that the definition of "person" included municipalities.62 The court also
52. See In re CitiSource, Inc. Sec. Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Washing-
ton Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 623 F. Supp. 1466 (W.D. Wash. 1985), affd on other
grounds, 823 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1987).
53. CitiSource, 694 F. Supp. at 1085; Washington Pub. Power, 623 F. Supp. at 1484.
54. Washington Pub. Power, 623 F. Supp. at 1477 (noting that the determination of whether a
private cause of action against municipalities exists under section 10(b) is a controversial and im-
portant one).
55. Id. at 1470.
56. Id.
57. The number of the public defendants illustrates the awesome magnitude of this litigation.
Such defendants included: the Washington Public Power Supply System, nine Washington cities,
nineteen Washington public utility districts, one Washington irrigation district, seven Oregon cities,
four Oregon public utility districts, five Idaho cities and a number of individuals sued in their official
governmental capacities. Id. at 1476 n.4.
58. Id. at 1476. The defendants conceded that there was strong support for the existence of a
private right of action against non-governmental parties (e.g., underwriters, dealers, etc.) for viola-
tion of section 10(b) in the sale or purchase of municipal securities, but argued that this liability did
not extend to municipalities. Id. at 1478.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1479. The court declined to evaluate this history however, preferring instead to note
that the Act was passed "in the context of a firmly established court-implied right of action under §





noted that numerous legal commentators had recognized that the
amendment created a private right of action against municipalities."
In holding that there was an implied private cause of action against
a municipality, the court recognized that there were prior cases reaching
the opposite conclusion." Each of these cases, however, applied the pre-
1975 definition of "person," and these "same court[s] would reach a dif-
ferent conclusion on that issue under the expanded definition of persons
in the 1975 amendment." Based on the determination that adopting the
plain language was the proper approach, and that due to the 1975
amendment, prior case law had no precedential value, the court held mu-
nicipalities were subject to the implied private cause of action recognized
under section 1 O(b).' In so doing, Washington Public Power laid a strong
analytical foundation for future courts confronted with this same issue.
In In re CitiSource, Inc. Securities Litigation,7 a stock underwriter
being sued by a securities purchaser brought a third-party action against
the municipality of New York City (NYC)." The stock underwriter
sought to impose liability on the municipality for the alleged violations
of section 10(b), consisting of misrepresentation and omission of mate-
rial fact by the city's employees.' NYC contended that a municipality is
not an entity to which the antifraud provision of section 10(b) applied.' °
The court immediately looked to the 1975 amendment of section 3(a)(9),
and acknowledged the addition of "government, or political subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality of a government" to the statute.' NYC argued,
however, that this amendment only extended liability to municipalities
63. Id. (providing a list of articles written after the 1975 amendment which concluded that the
section 3(a)(9) definition of "person" now included municipalities).
64. Id. (discussing In re Equity Funding Corp. of America Sec. Litig., 416 F. Supp. 161, 198
(C.D. Ca. 1976), and In re New York City Mun. Sec. Litig., 507 F. Supp. 169, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
65. Id.; see Brown v. City of Covington, 805 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1986) (affirming the district
court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims against City for securities fraud in sale of municipal bonds
because alleged omission and misstatements occurred prior to the 1975 amendment, meaning the
municipality, under section 3(a)(9), was not a "person" subject to 10(b) liability when the violations
occurred); Woods v. Homes & Structures, 489 F. Supp. 1270, 1280-82 (D. Kan. 1980) (rejecting
defendant's argument that the 1975 amendment was simply a clarifying amendment, and holding
that prior to 1975 the section 3(a)(9) definition of "person" did not subject municipalities to liability
under section 10 )); New York City Mun., 507 F. Supp. at 180-81 (concluding that Congress's need
to amend section 3(a)(9) in 1975 to include government entities in def'iition of "person" under
section 10(b) proved that, prior to the amendment, municipalities were not encompassed by the
definition); Equity Funding Corp., 416 F. Supp. at 197-98 (dismissing plaintiff's section 10(b) claim
against state because the pre-1975 section 3(a)(9) definition of "person" "simply does not encompass
states or their agencies").
66. Washington Pub. Power, 632 F. Supp. at 1480.
67. 694 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
68. CitiSource, 694 F. Supp. at 1072.
69. id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1073.
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when they acted as issuers.'2 In contrast to the municipal defendants in
Washington Public Power, NYC alleged that liability was not based on
the city acting as an issuer, but instead on misrepresentations and omis-
sions made by city employees in connection with the sale of CitiSource,
Inc. securities." The court rejected such a distinction, and after reviewing
the legislative history"' of the 1975 amendment, determined that Con-
gress's goal was to "improve efficiency, responsiveness, and fairness in
the operation of the securities markets and to improve investor protec-
tion."'" Such a goal, the court reasoned, would require a literal reading of
the 1975 amendment, resulting in imposing section 10(b) liability on
both issuing and non-issuing municipalities." Therefore, the court denied
NYC's motion to dismiss.'
Although the issue of municipality liability under section 10(b) was
never considered by a federal appellate court before November 1996, the
issue had been extensively deliberated by two federal district courts. The
court in Washington Public Power provided a solid foundation by hold-
ing that the plain language of the 1975 amendment imposed municipal
liability.78 The CitiSource court took this conclusion one step further by
determining such liability was imposed by the 1975 amendment, regard-
less of whether the municipality was acting in an issuing or non-issuing
capacity.'9
72. Id. The court mentioned that NYC argued that Congress did not intend to extend the
section 10(b) implied private cause of action to municipalities, but suggested that the city did not
press this argument because of the clear language of the statute and the previous holding in Wash-
ington Public Power. Id. (citing Washington Pub. Power, 623 F. Supp. at 1478-80).
73. Id. at 1071-72.
74. Id. at 1074. After reviewing Senate Report 75 (S. REP. No. 94-75, reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 179), and House Conference Report 229 (H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94-229, reprinted in
1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179), the court made the determination that municipality liability for violation of
section 10(b) was intended by Congress in the 1975 amendment. Id. The court noted that the Senate
Report focused on the fact that Congress was concerned with abuses committed by securities profes-
sionals in the municipal securities market, stating its fear that these abuses would lead to an erosion
of the public's confidence in that market, thereby jeopardizing capital raised by municipalities in the
municipal securities market. Id. The court also felt that the Senate Report and the House Conference
Report evidenced an intent to improve investor protection in general. Id. These two legislative con-
cems, held the court, were consistent with a literal reading of section 3(a)(9), which would impose
section 10(b) liability on municipalities. Id.
75. id. (citing S. REP. No. 94-75, at 2 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 179).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1085.
78. Washington Pub. Power, 623 F. Supp. at 1479.
79. CitiSource, 694 F. Supp. at 1074.
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B. Sonnenfeld v. City and County of Denver"0
1. Facts
The plaintiffs brought a securities fraud action against the City and
County of Denver,' alleging that the defendants made false and
misleading statements in the issuance of bonds to finance a new airport."2
Denver moved to dismiss on the grounds that there was "no implied
private cause of action against municipalities under § 10(b) or Rule lOb-
5."' The district court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and
Denver appealed."'
2. Decision
On appeal the court focused on whether a municipality was subject
to section 10(b) liability under an implied private cause of action. 5 While
it was clear that the SEC could take action against local governments to
enforce section 10(b)," no federal appellate court had yet considered
municipality liability under the implied private right of actionY Initially,
the court discussed the 1975 amendment." The court recognized that the
plain language of the amendment seemed to mandate that municipalities
were subject to compliance with the Exchange Act's antifraud provi-
sions. 9 The defendants, however, argued that "Congress did not intend to
create an implied private section 10(b) cause of action against munici-
palities when it expressly subjected governments and political subdivi-
sions" to the definition of "person" in section 3(a)(9).'The district court,
when confronted with this argument, followed CitiSource and Washing-
ton Public Power and determined that the 1975 amendment did indeed
subject municipalities to section 10(b) liability.9 '
The Tenth Circuit stated that the court must look to the "'contempo-
rary legal context"' at the time the legislation was enacted to determine
if Congress intended, expressly or implicitly, to create a private cause of
80. 100 F.3d 744 (1Oth Cir. 1996).
81. Sonnenfeld, 100 F.3d at 745.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 745-46.
84. Id. at 746.
85. Id.
86. Id. (citing In re County of Orange, 61 S.E.C. 310 (1996)).
87. As stated previously, two district court cases had decided this issue in the affirmative. See
In re CitiSource, Inc. Sec. Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Washington Pub. Power
Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 623 F. Supp. 1466 (W.D. Wash. 1985), affd on other grounds, 823 F.2d
1349 (9th Cir. 1987).
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action.93 The court concluded that, because the implied private right of
action under section 10(b) was so well established in 1975, Congress
must have intended to subject municipalities to such actions.'
To bolster this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit inspected the "limited"
legislative history which accompanied the 1975 amendment.9 Like the
court in CitiSource," the Tenth Circuit determined that the primary ob-
jective of this legislation was to regulate the professionals who deal in
municipal securities such as underwriters, dealers, and brokers. The
language of the legislative history made it clear that municipal securities
were to remain exempt from all substantive registration requirements of
the 1933 Act;" but, the court also determined that Congress "clearly in-
tended" municipal securities to remain subject to the securities law
antifraud provisions.' Moreover, the court stated that, regardless of
whether Congress intended the 1975 amendment to section 3(a)(9) as a
clarification or as a substantive change in the law, the net effect was to
subject municipalities to section 10(b) liability.'m
Finally, the Tenth Circuit, like the court in Washington Public
Power, recognized that there were numerous cases which held that sec-
tion 10(b) liability was inapplicable to municipalities."' The court sum-
marily dismissed the importance of these cases on the basis that they all
were applying the pre-1975 definition of "person."'"° Thus, on the first
impression issue of municipality liability under section 10(b), the court
93. Id. (citing Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979)).
94. Id. ("We conclude that in the contemporary legal context of 1975, Congress intended by
its 1975 amendment to subject municipalities to the then well-established private right of action
under §10(b) when it expressly brought municipalities within the scope of that section.").
95. Id. at 747-48.
96. See supra text accompanying note 74.
97. Sonnenfeld, 100 F.3d at 748. Senate Report 75 detailed some of the abuses by profession-
als in the municipal securities field which led to the need for heightened regulation. See S. REP. No.
94-75, at 43 (1979), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 221. Such abuses included "unconscionable
markups, churning of customers' accounts, misrepresentations concerning the nature and value of
municipal securities, disregard of suitability standards, and scandalous high-pressure sales tech-
niques." Id. The report states that without "additional statutory authority" the SEC would be unable
to curb such violations. Id.
98. Senate Report 75 states:
The Committee is mindful of the historical relationship between the federal secu-
rities laws and issuers of municipal securities. Apart from the general antifraud
provision, municipal securities are exempt from all substantive requirements.
Most significantly, this means that state and local governments do have to com-
ply with the registration and disclosure requirements of the Securities Act of
1933. The bill does not in any way change this pattern, for the Committee is not
aware of any abuses which would justify such a radical incursion on states' pre-
rogatives.
Id., reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 221-22.
99. Sonnenfeld, 100 F.3d at 748.




held, "[C]ongress intended the 1975 amendment to recognize an implied
private cause of action against municipalities.""
C. Analysis
Sonnenfeld, while a crucial decision of first impression in the fed-
eral appellate court system, may also be a single component of a larger
pattern imposing heightened restrictions on the municipal securities field.
Historically, municipalities have been immune from federal securities
regulation. Since 1975, however, this immunity has slowly eroded.'"
This erosion is a result of congressional legislation," judicial decisions,'1
and regulatory agency enforcement." Considering the amount of money
which is within the municipal securities market, it is a wonder such
regulation was so slow in arriving. For example, in 1993 there was $1.2
trillion in outstanding municipal securities.' Of that total, $480 billion
was held by individual households and another $370 billion was owned
by investment companies;" meaning individual investors owned-di-
rectly and indirectly-seventy percent of outstanding municipal securi-
ties." 0By comparison, in 1986, individual investors controlled only forty-
five percent of outstanding municipal securities."' With the amount of
money and the number of non-institutional investors involved, it is un-
103. Id. at 749.
104. See Robert W. Doty & John E. Peterson, The Federal Securities Laws and Transactions in
Municipal Securities, 71 Nw. U. L. REV. 283, 284-85 (1976). In prefacing their discussion of such
erosion, Doty and Peterson stated:
Over 40 years have elapsed since the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, and it has been over 30 years since the promulgation of Rule lOb-
5. Yet, until 1975, the municipal securities market-one of the nation's largest securities mar-
kets-was almost untouched by these otherwise all-encompassing legislative and regulatory
schemes.
Id.; see also Ann J. Gellis, Mandatory Disclosure for Municipal Securities: Issues in Implementa-
tion, 13 J. CORP. L. 65, 67 n.6 (1987) (contrasting pre-1975 cases with changes made in the 1975
amendments); Quinton F. Seamons & David S. Schaffer, Jr., Emerging Disclosure Issues for Mu-
nicipal Securities, 24 SEC. REG. L.J. 392, 392 (1997) (explaining the disclosure regime for munici-
pal securities under recently enacted legislation).
105. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (1994) (adding "government, or political subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality of a government" to the Exchange Act definition of "person"); Seamons & Schaffer,
supra note 104, at 393-94 (explaining Securities Exchange Act Rule 15c2-12, promulgated in 1989,
requiring for the first time that municipal issuers disclose material facts in the issuance of municipal
securities, and the 1994 amendment requiring such disclosure in the sale of municipal bonds in
secondary markets).
106. See Sonnenfeld, 100 F.3d at 749; In re CitiSource, Inc. Sec. Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1069,
1074 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 623 F. Supp. 1466,
1480 (W.D. Wa. 1985), affd on other grounds, 823 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1987).
107. See In re County of Orange, 61 S.E.C. 310 (1996) (filing by the Securities and Exchange
Commission for the first time naming a county as a defendant for alleged violations of section
10(b)).
108. Neil S. Lang & Linda M. Gardner, The SEC's Attempt to Impose a Regulatory Regime on
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derstandable that Congress"' and the SEC"3 expressed interest in the
regulation of the municipal securities market. The question raised by this
trend of greater regulation is what the cost will be to municipalities.
The legislative history of the 1975 amendment recognized that mu-
nicipalities relied heavily on the capital which is raised through these
securities."' There was concern, then, that regulations which were en-
acted in 1975 and subsequent thereto would place too high a cost on mu-
nicipalities hoping to raise capital."' At the same time, however, Con-
gress noted that if certain deceptive practices continued in the municipal
securities industry, municipal capital could be jeopardized because of
loss of confidence in the market."6 Therefore, when considering the mu-
nicipal securities market there were two approaches which theoretically
could have been taken. First, Congress could have taken a "hands-off'
approach, allowing the industry to operate unfettered by fraud liability
and registration requirements. Such a system would allow municipalities
to raise money cheaply and efficiently, as there would be virtually no
administrative costs. The obvious drawback of this approach would be
the danger of graft and corruption becoming so prevalent that investors
would not put their money into municipal securities. The alternative ap-
proach would be a system of regulation which insured investor protec-
tion. In this scenario, administrative costs ' 7 would rise dramatically, but
hopefully they would be offset by the demand created in the investing
public, who would be confident enough to invest in municipal securities.
Prior to the Tenth Circuit's decision in Sonnenfeld, Congress,"' the
SEC,"9 and two federal district courts'" had determined the latter of these
two alternatives was more appropriate. By concluding that municipalities
112. See Seamons & Schaffer, supra note 104 for a discussion of legislation passed since 1975
which places regulations on the municipal securities market.
113. In November 1995, Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the SEC, stated: "Municipal finance is the
No.1 priority of the Commission .... [IUt's an obsession of mine, and we're going to come down
hard. Municipal officials are the custodians of billions of dollars in public funds, and those who have
committed fraud will be called to task." There's a New Sheriff in Town-The SEC Extends Its Reach
to Municipal Finance, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. to, 1995, at DI [hereinafter There's a New Sheriff in
Town].
114. S. REP. No. 94-75, at 38 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 216.
115. Id. at 43, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 222. At one hearing, a witness representing
the Municipal Finance Officers Association indicated the concem in the municipal securities busi-
ness for so-called "splash" and collateral costs, which certain members of the industry felt would
accompany regulations on municipal securities. Id.
116. Id., reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179,221.
117. "Administrative costs" in this context means money spent by a municipality in an effort to
meet the registration requirements imposed and to avoid being subject to fraud liability.
118. See Seamons & Schaffer, supra note 104 for a discussion of legislation enacted since 1975
which has placed regulations on municipal securities.
119. See There's a New Sheriff in Town, supra note 113.
120. See In re CitiSource, Inc. Sec. Litig, 694 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Washing-
ton Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 623 F. Supp. 1466 (W.D. Wash. 1985), affd on other
grounds, 823 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1987).
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are subject to section 10(b) liability, the Tenth Circuit reinforced Con-
gress's intent to take the route of investor protection to ensure the con-
tinuing availability of capital raised through municipal securities.
III. "BESPEAKS CAUTION" DOCTRINE
A. Background
1. General Background
Forward-looking statements'2 ' are often included in attempts to sell
securities. Such statements, like almost all statements made in connec-
tion with the sale or purchase of a security, can expose the party making
the statement to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability. In a section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 action, where the plaintiff alleges that the defendant
made a false or misleading forward-looking statement, the defendant
may invoke the "bespeaks caution" doctrine as a defense. The doctrine
can be summarized as
providing a mechanism by which a court can rule as a matter of law
(typically in a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action
or a motion for summary judgment) that defendants' forward-looking
representations contained enough cautionary language or risk disclo-
sure to protect the defendant against claims of securities fraud.',
While many courts have considered the complexities of the doctrine, the
court in Rubinstein v. Collins"n explained it best when it stated that the
"bespeaks caution" doctrine stands for the "unremarkable proposition
that statements must be analyzed in context" to determine if they are
truly misleading.'2"
To establish securities fraud liability under section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) the defendant
must have made a false statement or omission of material fact in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of a security; (2) the defendant must have
done so with scienter, (3) the plaintiff must have justifiably relied upon
121. The term "forward-looking statements" in this context means statements which "disclose
prospective, as opposed to historical, information .... In general, they are 'statements concerning
the future, such as projections, forecasts, predictions, and statements concerning plans and expecta-
tions."' Jennifer O'Hare, Good Faith and the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine: It's Not Just a State of
Mind, 58 U. Prrr. L. REV. 619, 619 n.2 (1997) (quoting Carl W. Schneider, Nits, Grits, and Soft
Information in SEC Filings, U. PA. L. REV. 254, 255 (1972)).
122. Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures that "Bespeak Caution," 49 BUS. LAW. 481, 482-83
(1994).
123. 20 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 1994).
124. Rubinstein, 20 F.3d at 167. The Third Circuit provided an equally eloquent and simple
definition for the doctrine when it stated, "As we see it, 'bespeaks caution' is essentially shorthand
for the well-established principle that a statement or omission must be considered in context, so that
accompanying statements may render it immaterial as a matter of law." In re Donald J. Trump
Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 364 (3d Cir. 1993).
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the statement or omission; and (4) the plaintiff must have proximately
suffered damages.'" The "bespeaks caution" doctrine focuses on the ele-
ments of materiality and reliance." Essentially, the doctrine operates by
allowing a defendant to claim that due to the cautionary language pro-
vided in connection with the sale of the security, the materiality element
and/or the reasonable reliance elements were never met."
When applying the "materiality" version of the "bespeaks caution"
doctrine, the question is whether "cautionary language operates within
the total mix of available information to render immaterial otherwise
material misrepresentations."'" Courts applying the "reasonable reliance"
version of the doctrine do so under the rationale that an investor will not
reasonably rely on a forward-looking statement when it is accompanied
by sufficient cautionary language." While the reasonable reliance ap-
proach could be applied individually,'30 more commonly it is mentioned
in concert with materiality. "' Regardless of whether the court used a
"materiality" approach, a "reasonable reliance" approach, or a combina-
125. Gasner v. Board of Supervisors, 103 F.3d 351,356 (4th Cir. 1996).
126. In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1414 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he doctrine,
when properly construed, merely represents the pragmatic application of two fundamental concepts
in the law of securities fraud: materiality and reliance.").
127. See Jonathan B. Lurvey, Who is Bespeaking to Whom? Plaintiff Sophistication, Market
Information, and Forward-Looking Statements, 45 DUKE L.J. 579, 588-97 (1995) (explaining the
complexities of the materiality and reasonable reliance elements of a section 10(b) action, and how
the court will base its application of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine on its evaluation of the caution-
ary language issued at the purchase or sale of the security); O'Hare, supra note 121, at 630-31 (not-
ing that instead of basing the "bespeaks caution" doctrine on failure to meet the materiality or reli-
ance elements, some courts have applied the doctrine using the theory that sufficient cautionary
language prevented certain forward-looking statements from being false or misleading as a matter of
law).
128. Lurvey, supra note 127, at 588. In Trump Casino, the Third Circuit offered an example of
a court basing its application of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine on the materiality element. Trump
Casino, 7 F.3d at 357. There, bondholders brought an action against issuers of bonds, claiming
forward-looking statements in the prospectus relating to the bonds contained material misrepresen-
tations. Id at 365. Upon considering plaintiffs' claim, the court stated that "cautionary language, if
sufficient, renders the alleged omissions or misrepresentations immaterial as a matter of law." Id. at
371. Thus, after finding the prospectus contained "extensive ... specific cautionary language," the
court held that the bondholders could not prove any of the alleged misrepresentations were material.
Id. at 369.
129. See O'Hare, supra note 121, at 636-37.
130. Id. at 636 n. 101 (explaining that while a section 10(b) claim has both a reliance and mate-
riality element, claims brought under sections II and 12(2) of the 1933 Act have only a materiality
element, meaning application of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine based on a "reliance" approach
would be useless).
131. See Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1493 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[Tlhe 'bespeaks caution'
doctrine is not new but a reformulation of two fundamental concepts in securities fraud law: reliance
and materiality.") (citing Worlds of Wonder, 35 F.3d at 1414); Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160,
167 (5th Cir. 1994) ("[Tihe 'bespeaks caution' doctrine has developed to address situations in which
optimistic projections are coupled with cautionary language ... affecting the reasonableness of the
reliance on and the materiality of those projections.").
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tion thereof, in recent years, the "bespeaks caution" doctrine has pro-
vided a defense for certain securities fraud defendants.
2. Development of the Doctrine
In Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., the Eighth Circuit humbly
pointed out that twenty years earlier, in Polin v. Conductron Corp.,'3 the
"bespeaks caution" doctrine was born in its court."" In reality, the term
"bespeaks caution" appeared as dicta in a footnote.'5 It was not until
1986, in Luce v. Edelstein,'" that the doctrine first served as grounds for
summary judgment in a securities fraud action.' 7 Regardless of which
date one assigns to the inception of the doctrine, it is impossible to ignore
the doctrine's incredible growth and acceptance in a short period of time.
Prior to 1997, every circuit except the Tenth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit
had adopted the doctrine.' 8 While Tenth Circuit district courts applied the
theory twice, " 9 until August of 1997, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
never formally adopted the doctrine as a defense to a securities fraud
claim.
3. Safe Harbor Provision
Not only has the "bespeaks caution" doctrine become a widely ac-
cepted theory of securities case law, but the basic premise of the doctrine
has also been reduced to statutory form in the Private Securities Litiga-
tion Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)." Congress passed the PSLRA in an
effort to discourage perceived abuses in the field of private security liti-
gation actions.'' Included within the PSLRA was a provision modeled
132. 122 F.3d 539 (8th Cir. 1997).
133. 522 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1977).
134. Parnes, 122 F.3d at 548.
135. Lurvey, supra note 127, at 587.
136. 802 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1986).
137. Lurvey, supra note 127, at 587-88. In Luce, the Second Circuit granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss on the grounds that the alleged misrepresentations in an offering memorandum
were surrounded by cautionary language that dealt directly with the statements at issue. Luce, 802
F.2d at 56.
138. See Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875 (1 st Cir. 1991); I. Meyer Pincus &
Assocs. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 939 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec.
Litig., 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993); Gasner v. Board of Supervisors, 103 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1996);
Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 1994); Sinay v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 948 F.2d 1037
(6th Cir. 1991); Hardin v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., Inc., 65 F.3d 1392 (7th Cir. 1995);
Moorhead v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 949 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1991); In re
Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994); Saltzberg v. TM Sterling/Austin As-
socs., 45 F.3d 399 (1 Ith Cir. 1995).
139. See Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 845, 850 (D. Utah 1995); In re Storage Tech.
Corp. Sec. Litig. 147 F.R.D. 232, 237 (D. Colo. 1993).
140. The "safe harbor" provision was incorporated in both the 1933 Act and the Exchange Act.
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 102(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2, 78u-5 (Supp.
1995).
141. According to House Conference Report 369, such abuses included:
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after the "bespeaks caution" doctrine. " ' The goal of the provision was to
encourage companies to provide the investing public with more forward-
looking information for investment decisions."3 Theoretically, companies
would be more willing to make forward-looking statements, because
under the protection of the PSLRA, they would not be concerned about
frivolous lawsuits based on those statements."
Referred to as the "safe harbor" provision, the PSLRA contains two
prongs under which a defendant could avoid securities fraud liability. "
First, a defendant's forward-looking statements fall within the safe har-
bor (meaning not subject to liability) if they are immaterial or identified
as forward-looking and accompanied by "meaningful cautionary state-
ments identifying important factors that could cause actual results to dif-
fer materially."'" Under the second prong, a defendant is not liable unless
the plaintiff shows that the defendant, with actual knowledge, made a
false or misleading forward-looking statement. "7 While the language of
the statutory "safe harbor" provision and the common law "bespeaks
caution" doctrine are not identical, the underlying, common law principle
is apparent in the newly enacted PSLRA.
Although the "safe harbor" provision was modeled after the judi-
cially created "bespeaks caution" doctrine, it is important to note that
Congress simply intended the "safe harbor" provisions to supplement,
not replace, the "bespeaks caution" doctrine."' While at first blush, it
would appear the "safe harbor" provision turns the "bespeaks caution"
doctrine into a securities law dinosaur, there are certain differences be-
tween the two which require that both be given individual
consideration.' 9 To date, the Tenth Circuit has not had an opportunity to
hear any cases which raise PSLRA issues. In August 1997, however, the
(1) the routine filing of lawsuits against issuers of securities and others whenever there is
a significant change in an issuer's stock price, without regard to any underlying culpabil-
ity of the issuer, and with only faint hope that the discovery process might lead eventually
to some plausible cause of action; (2) the targeting of deep pocket defendants, including
accountants, underwriters, and individuals who may be covered by insurance, without re-
gard to their actual culpability; (3) the abuse of the discovery process to impose cost so
burdensome that it is often economical for the victimized party to settle; and (4) the ma-
nipulation by class action lawyers of the clients who they purportedly represent.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,730.
142. Id. at 43, reprinted in 1995 U.S.S.C.A.N. 730, 742.
143. Steven J. Spencer, Note, Has Congress Learned Its Lesson? A Plain Meaning Analysis of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 99, 111-12 (1997).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 114-15 (explaining the "safe harbor" two-prong system).
146. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c)(l)(A)(i), 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. 1995).
147. Id. §§ 77z-2(c)(l)(B)(i), 78u-5(c)(l)(B)(i).
148. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 46 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.S.C.A.N 730, 745
("The Conference Committee does not intend for the safe harbor provision to replace the judicial
'bespeaks caution' doctrine or to foreclose further development of that doctrine by the courts.").
149. See infra Part I.D for a discussion of the differences between the "safe harbor" provision
and the "bespeaks caution" doctrine.
[Vol. 75:31094
Tenth Circuit did have its first opportunity to consider the "bespeaks
caution" doctrine.
B. Grossman v. Novell, Inc.'"
1. Facts
Plaintiffs brought a shareholder class action against Novell, Inc.,
(Novell), alleging violations of sections 10(b) ' and 20(a)1 52 of the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934.' The district court granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss and the plaintiffs appealed. 5 The plaintiffs' securities
fraud claims centered on statements made by Novell officers and direc-
tors regarding a merger between Novell and WordPerfect Corporation
(WordPerfect).' In connection with this merger, where Novell was to
issue stock which it would exchange for outstanding WordPerfect shares,
Novell filed a registration statement and three amendments with the
SEC.'s Within the registration statement and its additional amendments,
Novell included numerous detailed warnings about the effects of the
merger. 15 7 On June 24, 1994, the merger was completed.' On August 19,
1994, Novell announced that it would not meet the previously published
financial estimates for the third quarter; instead, the earnings would be
between fifteen and twenty percent below expected amounts.' 59 The fol-
lowing business day Novell's stock dropped seven percent.
'60
The named plaintiff, a Novell shareholder, initiated this action
claiming that Novell, its officers, and directors made misleading state-
ments and omissions regarding the merger.'6' The court certified the class
150. 120 F.3d 1112(10th Cir. 1997).
151. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
152. Id. § 78t(a).
153. Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1115 (1Oth Cir. 1997).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. Novell filed the registration statement on April 22, 1994, and filed the three amend-
ments to the statement in June 1994. Id.
157. Id. at 1116. Novell's warnings gave notice that: (1) integration could be difficult due to
intense competition in WordPerfect's market and the declining financial performance of the target
company; (2) Novell's profits and stock price could fluctuate after the merger, (3) the merger would
be difficult because Novell did not have management or marketing experience in new markets which
the merger would open; (4) there was no guarantee the different businesses could be integrated; (5)
intense competition from Microsoft should be expected; (6) the merger would lead to higher expen-
ditures; and (7) future earnings and stock prices could be subject to volatile change following the
merger. Id. Then, in amended pro forma financial statements, Novell explained that WordPerfect's
first quarter results were worse than expected and that those results could adversely affect Novell
stock prices. Id. Furthermore, in subsequent amendments to the registration statement, Novell pro-
vided additional warnings such as significant deterioration in WordPerfect's sales and profits. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. Novell announced that it would incur a $120 million charge against earnings for the
quarter. Id.
160. Id. Novell's stock went from $15.12 per share to $14 per share. Id.
161. Id. at 1115.
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as all purchasers of Novell stock buying between April 27, 1994 and
August 19, 1994. 6' The plaintiffs did not allege that any material mis-
statements or omissions were contained in the registration statement.'
Instead, the alleged misstatements and omissions were made by the de-
fendant's officers and directors in their statements to the press.'"
2. Decision
In dismissing the plaintiffs' claims the district court held that the
plaintiffs failed to allege materially misleading statements or omissions,
that Novell disclosed the risks of the merger, and finally, that the plaintiff
failed to plead fraud with particularity.'65 The plaintiffs appealed, claim-
ing the district court erred in all three of its securities law holdings.'"
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court decision, stating that
the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action under the securities laws. 7
The court determined that the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action
on three separate grounds. These grounds included: (1) some of the
statements were immaterial because they were simply "corporate opti-
mism" or "mere puffing;' 68 (2) some of the statements were immaterial
because accompanying statements "bespoke caution;"'" and (3) some of
the statements were not actionable because the plaintiffs failed to allege
falsity regarding those statements.' 70
The court explained that to satisfy the elements of Rule 1 Ob-5 ,'7' a
plaintiff must allege facts showing the defendant made misrepresenta-
tions of material fact or omitted a material fact necessary to avoid mis-
leading investors.' 2 A statement is material only when a reasonable in-
162. Id. at 1116.
163. Id.
164. Id. These included statements by Novell's senior vice-president that it appeared WordPer-
fect's market share was increasing and that the merger would not have a dilutive effect; by Novell's
president, CEO, and chairman three days after the merger that Novell was experiencing success in
integrating WordPerfect and that the company was creating new products; by WordPerfect's CEO
and then-president of Novell's applications group shortly after the merger that it was one of the
"smoothest of mergers in recent history," id. at 1116-17; by Novell's president, CEO, and chairman
after the merger that "he was pleased with the pace of product development," id.; and by Novell in
July 1994 that integration was going well. Id.
165. Id. at 1117.
166. Id.
167. /d. at 1119.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1123-24.
171. Id. at 1118 (citing Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982, 986 (10th Cir.
1992)). The court explained that to "[s]tate a claim under Rule lOb-5, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a
misleading statement or omission of material fact; (2) made in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities; (3) with intent to defraud or recklessness; (4) reliance; and (5) damages." Id.
172. Id. at 1119 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997)).
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vestor would consider it important when deciding whether to buy or sell
a particular security.'"
Within this context, the court set out to determine whether any of
the statements made by Novell or its personnel were material. First, the
court held certain statements immaterial because they were simply ex-
amples of corporate optimism on behalf of the Novell employees. 7 The
court found statements such as these "the sort of soft, puffing statements,
incapable of objective verification, that courts routinely dismiss as vague
statements of corporate optimism.'" In addition, certain statements
made by Novell employees were not actionable because the plaintiffs
failed to allege their falsity.'76 In disposing of these statements, the court
explained that a plaintiff must not simply allege falsity in their com-
plaint, but must "set forth what is false or misleading about a statement,
and why it is false."'" The court held that the plaintiff did not meet the
falsity requirement and, therefore, failed to state a claim regarding those
particular statements.
The court also considered whether the district court properly applied
the "bespeaks caution" doctrine when it dismissed certain portions of the
plaintiffs' complaint as immaterial.'79 The court began its analysis by ac-
knowledging that the "bespeaks caution" doctrine was simply a method
of finding certain statements immaterial-and therefore irrelevant in a
securities fraud claim-when accompanied by sufficient cautionary lan-
guage in documents available to the investor. " The doctrine provided a
court with the vehicle for ruling, as a matter of law, that "'defendants'
forward-looking representations contained enough cautionary language
or risk disclosure to protect the defendant against claims of securities
fraud."""' However, the court recognized that not every risk disclosure
was sufficient to protect the defendant from securities fraud liability;
173. Id. (citing TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976), and Basic v. Levinson,
485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988)).
174. Id. at 1121-22. The statements that the court concluded were simply corporate optimism
included the statement by Novell's president, CEO, and chairman that they were having "substantial
success" integrating WordPerfect and that the merger was moving "faster than we thought," and the
statement by Novell that, in combining Novell's and WordPerfect's knowledge of network applica-
tions, they were coming up with new solutions for customers. Id. at 1121.
175. Id. at 1121-22.
176. Id. at 1123-24. The statements which fell into this category included the statement by
Novell's president, CEO, and chairman that the company had not slowed down efforts to create new
products, but instead had accelerated its efforts, the statement by Novell's vice-president of finance
that reports showed WordPerfect was expanding its market share, and the statement by WordPer-
fect's CEO and then-president of Novell's application group that this was the merger was one of the
"smoothest of mergers in recent history." Id. at 1123.
177. Id. at 1124 (quoting In re GlenFed Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th Cir. 1994) (en
banc)).
178. Id.
179. Id. at I119.
180. Id. at 1120.
181. Id. (quoting In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1413 (9th Cir. 1994)).
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noting, instead, that the "bespeaks caution" doctrine applied when cau-
tionary statements directly addressed the specific forward-looking state-
ments challenged by the plaintiff.8 ' The court acknowledged that every
circuit which considered the issue had accepted the doctrine' 3 and then
recognized the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, as defined in Grossman, as a
valid defense in the Tenth Circuit.'
84
After adopting the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, the court considered
whether the district court properly applied the doctrine.' 5 The court found
that two statements were forward-looking and, thus, subject to the "be-
speaks caution" doctrine." Neither of these statements were proper
grounds to state a cause of action, concluded the court, because the reg-
istration statement provided a detailed explanation of the risks
involved.' 7 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit ruled the district court properly
applied the "bespeaks caution" doctrine."'
The plaintiffs argued, however, that the doctrine should not be ap-
plied because the statements in question and the risk disclosures made by
Novell were contained in different documents.' 9 The plaintiffs contended
that cautionary statements must be contained in the same document as
the alleged misstatements for the "bespeaks caution" doctrine to apply' 9°
In dealing with the plaintiffs' "same document" argument, the Tenth
Circuit noted that the court in In re Worlds of Wonder Securities Litiga-
tion'9' stated that the "bespeaks caution" doctrine applied only where the
"precise cautionary language elsewhere in the document adequately dis-
closes the risks involved."'" The Tenth Circuit determined, however, the
182. Id. (quoting In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371 (3d Cir. 1993)).
183. Id.at1120-21.
184. Id. at 1121. While the court does not explicitly state "we adopt the doctrine for the afore-
mentioned reasons," it appears that the district court's successful application of the doctrine and its
overwhelming acceptance in other federal appellate circuits were the basis for the Tenth Circuit's
decision. See id. at 1118-21.
185. Id.at 1121.
186. Id. The statement by the vice-president of finance that the merger would not have a dilut-
ing effect on Novell's future earnings and the statement by Novell that by rapidly integrating, the
company was expanding the scope of its "network solutions" by combining Novell's and WordPer-
fect's knowledge and "quickly reshaping customer expectations" fell into this category. Id.
187. Id at 1122. The court pointed out that the registration statement clearly explained that the
merger could have a drastic effect on future earnings, specifically third quarter earnings. Id. The
court further noted that the statements dealt in great detail with both the subject of combining the
companies' knowledge and reshaping customer expectations. Id
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. Although the decision does not explicitly articulate plaintiffs' argument, from the
court's analysis it is obvious the plaintiffs argued that the disclosure and the statement must be in the
same document for the doctrine to apply. See id.
191. 35 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994).
192. Grossman, 120 F.3d at 1122 (quoting In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407,




quoted language was merely dicta.93 Other courts did not require that the
cautionary language appear in the same document with the alleged mis-
statement.' Thus, the court determined that because there was no prece-
dent which demanded the cautionary language appear in the document
with the alleged misstatement, 95 the real question, especially in a fraud
on the market situation," was the total mix of information available to
investors at the time of the allegedly fraudulent statements."
The court found that the available information was extensive.' The
cautionary statements appeared in the formal registration statement and
its amendments, and the alleged misstatements occurred in press releases
and interviews. ' The court noted that both the cautionary language and
the alleged misstatements were relatively close in time.' Furthermore,
the court found that all of the statements in the press releases and inter-
views were obviously directly related to the merger which was described
in detail in the registration statements." Considering the close proximity
and obvious relation of the cautionary language to the alleged misstate-
ments, the court determined there was adequate information available to
the market.' The court held that the cautionary language limited the for-
ward-looking projections made by the company, its officers, and direc-
tors, irrespective of the fact that all the statements were not contained in
a single document.'
193. Id.
194. Id. (citing San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos.,
75 F.3d 801, 811 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding general optimistic statements made to press not actionable
under the "bespeaks caution" doctrine where the defendant, in an annual report, disclosed that com-
petition from discount markets could have an adverse effect on company sales) and Raab v. General
Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 289 (4th Cir. 1993) (concluding that cautionary statements in a press
release made the same day as an annual report, bespoke caution as to optimistic statements contained
in the annual report)).
195. Grossman, 120 F.3d at 1122 ("It does not appear that any court has squarely held that risk
disclosure must be in the same document as the alleged misstatements.").
196. The Third Circuit explained the theory of "fraud on the market" as follows:
The "fraud on the market" theory accords plaintiffs in Rule lOb-5 class actions a re-
buttable presumption of reliance if plaintiffs bought or sold their securities in an "effi-
cient" market. Plaintiffs using this theory need not show that they actually knew of the
communication that contained the misrepresentation or omission. Instead, plaintiffs are
accorded the presumption of reliance based on the theory that in an efficient market
the misinformation directly affects the stock prices at which the investor trades and
thus, through the inflated or deflated price, causes the injury even in the absence of di-
rect reliance.
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1419 n.8 (3d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
197. Grossman, 120 F.3d at 1122.
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C. Other Circuits
With the Tenth Circuit's adoption of the "bespeaks caution" doc-
trine, every circuit except the D.C. Circuit has adopted and actively ap-
plies it.' During the survey period, the Fourth and the Ninth Circuits
called on the doctrine.
In Gasner v. Board of Supervisors,' a bond investor sued the county
and its industrial development authority for securities fraud after the de-
fendants defaulted on bonds." The bonds were issued to finance the con-
struction of a solid waste processing facility.' The plaintiff alleged that
the defendants made untrue or misleading statements as to material facts
in the sale of the bonds in violation of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.'
The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment
and the plaintiff appealed." On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court's holding"' after determining the extensive cautionary lan-
guage of the offering statement rendered the alleged misstatements im-
material.2 ' Thus, in Gasner, the cautionary statements "bespoke caution"
and prevented the plaintiff from proving the materiality element of a
section 10(b) claim."2
During the survey period the Ninth Circuit also considered the "be-
speaks caution" doctrine in Provenz v Miller.t3 There, plaintiffs brought a
class action suit against a computer company and its officers, alleging
securities fraud under section 10(b) and Rule l0b-5., The plaintiffs
contended that the defendants inflated the price of the company stock
value by recognizing revenue before it was earned, and by failing to dis-
close material information about the company's products. 25 The defen-
204. See Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1991); I. Me..er V'... us &
Assocs. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 939 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec.
Litig., 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993); Gasner v. Board of Supervisors, 103 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1996);
Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 1994); Sinay v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 948 F.2d 1037
(6th Cir. 1991); Hardin v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., Inc., 65 F.3d 1392 (7th Cir. 1995);
Moorhead v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 949 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1991); In re
Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994); Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d
1112 (10th Cir. 1997); Saltzberg v. TM Sterling/Austin Assocs., 45 F.3d 399 (11 th Cir. 1995).
205. 103 F.3d 351 (4th Cir. 1996).
206. See Gasner, 103 F.3d at 353.
207. See id. at 355.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 354.
210. Id. at 362.
211. Id. at 359 ("The venture failed because of the occurrence of the very same events outlined
as risks in the Offering Statement.").
212. See Lurvey, supra note 127, for a discussion of how courts embracing the "bespeaks
caution" doctrine view appropriate cautionary language in forward-looking statements as dispositive
of the materiality and reliance elements in a section 10(b) action.
213. 102 F.3d 1478 (9th Cir. 1996).
214. Provenz, 102 F.3d at 1482.
215. Id. at 1482-83.
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dants asserted a "bespeaks caution" defense claiming that their caution-
ary statements, made to the market, counteracted any alleged misrepre-
sentations or nondisclosures.2 ' When considering the defendants argu-
ment, the court stated that the statements considered to be cautionary
must be "precise" and "directly address" the defendants' future projec-
tions, and that "[b]lanket warnings that securities involve a high degree
of risk [are] insufficient to ward against a federal securities fraud
claim."2 '7 Because the defendants' cautionary statements were general
warnings about the uncertainty of the economic environment, and failed
to disclose that the company was recognizing revenue before it was
earned, the court held the "bespeaks caution" inapplicable. '
While neither the Fourth Circuit's decision in Gasner nor the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Provenz dramatically altered the "bespeaks caution"
doctrine, the two cases illustrate different understandings about the doc-
trine's foundation."9 In Gasner, the Fourth Circuit applied the "bespeaks
caution" doctrine solely on the grounds that the cautionary language ne-
gated the materiality of the alleged misstatements or non-disclosures.
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit, in Provenz, explained "the 'bespeaks cau-
tion' doctrine is not new but a reformulation of two fundamental con-
cepts in securities fraud law: reliance and materiality."2 ' Ultimately,
these different foundational interpretations seem to be insignificant and
appear to pose no threat to the further development of this relatively
young securities law doctrine.
D. Analysis
Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in
1995.' Contained within this act is the "safe harbor" provision, which is
essentially a statutory form of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine.2" Con-
gress passed this legislation because it recognized securities issuers' re-
luctance to disclose forward-looking statements, which could be helpful
to investors, due to the risk of litigation over those statements. " In Son-
nenfeld, the Tenth Circuit did not have an opportunity to consider the
PSLRA's "safe harbor" provision because the litigation began just
months before the enactment of the PSLRA." Instead, the Tenth Circuit
216. Id. at 1493.
217. Id. (quoting In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1414 (9th Cir. 1994)).
218. Id. at 1494 (reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants).
219. See Langevoort, supra note 122 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "bespeaks
caution" doctrine as a mechanism for judicial discretion.
220. Gasner v. Board of Supervisors, 103 F.3d 351,359 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing In re Donald J.
Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371 (3d Cir. 1993)).
221. Provenz, 102 F.3d at 1493 (quoting Worlds of Wonder, 35 F.3d at 1414).
222. See supra Part II.A.
223. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 43 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
742.
224. See id. at 42-43, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 742.
225. See Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d at 1118 n.4 (10th Cir. 1997).
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analyzed the forward-looking statements at issue under the "bespeaks
caution" doctrine.226 With the "safe harbor" provision now firmly in place,
it would seem that the Tenth Circuit adopted the "bespeaks caution"
doctrine just in time for it to become outdated. However, upon closer
examination, one finds several differences between the "safe harbor"
provision and the "bespeaks caution" doctrine which warrant retention of
the doctrine.
First, Congress limited the application of the "safe harbor" provi-
sion. ' Only corporate issuers subject to the reporting requirements of the
Exchange Act, or select persons working for such corporations, may in-
voke the provision." Non-corporate entities-such as limited liability
companies, partnerships, or limited partnerships-are not protected?"
Second, the "safe harbor" also includes a number of exclusions. ' ° For
example, the provision does not apply to forward-looking statements if
they are published in connection with a blank check company, penny
stock, a rollup transaction, or a going private transaction. z' Furthermore,
the "safe harbor" does not apply to forward-looking statements included
in financial statements prepared according to GAAP, initial public of-
fering registration statements, or tender offers. 2 Finally, forward-looking
statements made by an issuer who has been convicted of securities fraud
or subject to an SEC administrative order within the last three years will
not be protected by the "safe harbor.""3
The significance of these limitations and exclusions is simple-
when the Tenth Circuit accepted the "bespeaks caution" doctrine as a
viable defense to a section 10(b) action, it adopted a working judicial
theory, not one devoid of meaning due to subsequent legislative
enactment. Granted, in the coming years much litigation will center
around the PSLRA's "safe harbor."'" However, there will be numerous
circumstances where the "safe harbor" will be ineffectual and the
defendants will have to rely on the "bespeaks caution" doctrine. After
Grossman, section 10(b) defendants have this option in the Tenth Circuit.
226. See id. at 1118-25.
227. See Denis T. Rice, A Practitioner's View of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 283, 311-12 (1997); Carl W. Schneider & Jay A. Dubow, Forward-Looking
Information-Navigating in the Safe Harbor, 51 Bus. LAW. 1070, 1076-77 (1996); Spencer, supra
note 143, at 112.
228. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(a), 78u-5(a) (Supp. 1995).
229. See id. §§ 77z-2(b)(2)(E), 78u-5(b)(2)(E).
230. See Rice, supra note 227, at 311-12; Schneider & Dubow, supra note 227, at 1076-77; and
Spencer, supra note 143, at 113, for a discussion of the "safe harbor" provision exclusions.
231. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(b)(l)(B)-(E), 78u-5(b)(1)(B)-(E).
232. See id. §§ 77z-2(b)(2)(A)-(C), 78u-5(b)(2)(A)-(C).
233. See id. §§ 77z-2(b)( 1 )(A), 78u-5(b)(1)(A).
234. See Spencer, supra note 143, at 124 (concluding that the language and legislative history
of the PSLRA are so ambiguous that, instead of achieving the goal of reducing litigation, the PSLRA
will actually create litigation).
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IV. CONCLUSION
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit promoted the interests
of two diametrically opposed groups in the securities field. On one hand,
Sonnenfeld furthers the goal of investor protection. The Tenth Circuit, by
concluding municipalities were persons subject to section 10(b) liability,
undoubtedly assured that issuers of municipal securities will take height-
ened precautions to comply with the securities law antifraud provisions.
Although such precautions may lead to additional administrative costs in
the municipal markets, hopefully the confidence created in municipal
securities will offset the added burden.
In contrast to expanding investor protection, the Tenth Circuit's
holding in Grossman created extra protection for section 10(b) violators.
Through its adoption of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, the court pro-
vided a defense for parties who violated section 10(b).
Can it be said, then, that this bipolar approach to securities liability
is endemic to the Tenth Circuit? Rather, it seems that the decisions in
Sonnenfeld and Grossman reflect a larger struggle with the basis of secu-
rities regulation. For example, when the 1933 Act and the Exchange Act
were passed, the caveat emptor approach to securities regulations was
replaced with a policy of investor protection. In 1995, however, Con-
gress feared the federal securities laws were being taken advantage of to
the detriment of securities issuers; thus, the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act was born. Incorporated within this act was the "safe harbor"
provision, which, similar to the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, provided
protection to alleged section 10(b) violators. Therefore, Congress, during
the last sixty-five years, has wrestled with the same question as the Tenth
Circuit. Just like Congress, the Tenth Circuit has concluded that, at
times, investors are the proper group to protect, while, at other times,
issuers are the party in need of protection.
Gian Maurelli
19981 SECURITIES 1103

